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1 Introduction
The macrodynamic models of equilibrium are usually divided in two streams de-
pending on whether households are life cycler (finite horizon) or altruistic, leaving
positive bequests (infinite horizon). Recently, Gregory Mankiw pointed at numer-
ous empirical facts to persuade economists that neither the Barro-Ramsey model of
intergenerational altruism nor the Diamond-Samuelson model of overlapping gener-
ations are consistent with the empirical findings1.
Instead of these two canonical models, Mankiw (2000a,b) proposes a macroeco-
nomic framework which seems to be best-suited to the large heterogeneity in con-
sumer behavior apparent in the data. Some altruistic people (namely, the savers)
have long time horizons, which is consistent with the great concentration of wealth
and the importance of bequests in aggregate capital accumulation. Others (namely,
the spenders) have short time horizons, as evidenced by the failure of consumption
smoothing and the prevalence of households with near zero net worth. This model
which combines agents à la Diamond and agents à la Barro yields some new and
surprising conclusions about fiscal policy2 and for Mankiw (2000b, p. 124):
“ The savers-spenders theory sketched here takes a small step toward
including this microeconomic heterogeneity in macroeconomic theory. ”
The purpose of this paper is to study other important implications of this new
sort of heterogeneity. Indeed, we shall show that the savers-spenders theory is ade-
quate to give microfoundations to the macroeconomic models with rentiers. Indeed
we shall study a savers-spenders model which allows us to show that the emergence
1Mankiw (2000a, p. 1 to 5) discusses empirical regularities which led him to reject both Dia-
mond’s (1965) model and Barro’s (1974) model.
2Indeed, fiscal policy such as public debt is found to be neutral at the aggregate level of capital
accumulation but redistributes resources from nonaltruistic to altruistic households (see also Michel
and Pestieau (1998) or Smetters (1999)).
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of rentiers is a natural consequence of intertemporal utility maximization. The emer-
gence of rentiers is then a consequence of microeconomic heterogeneity and of the
labor-leisure choice introduced in Mankiw’s (2000a,b) model.
In the growth literature there are broadly two kinds of macroeconomic models
with rentiers. The most famous are issued from the Kaldorian tradition of two-class
growth models (capital owners and workers). In these models (see, for instance,
Kaldor (1956) or Pasinetti (1962)), it is assumed the existence in the society of
an exogenous proportion of workers and rentiers (i.e., capital owners who do not
work). Then, the long run equilibrium is also determined by the exclusive savings of
rentiers (see Britto (1972)). The most recent macroeconomic models with rentiers
are used to study stationary sunspots or/and endogenous business cycle (see, for
instance, Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (1998) or Barinci (2001)) and are based
on the finance constrained economy developed by Woodford (1986). Briefly outlined,
these models consider two assets - money and capital - and feature two classes of
infinite lived agents labelled workers and rentiers. It is assumed that workers supply
a variable quantity of labor time units, depending on their per period liquidity
constraint. Such a constraint is meant to reflect the difficulty they have in borrowing
against labor income, whereas rentiers do not work.3
To give realistic microfoundations to models with an exogenous proportion of
rentiers, we focus on an OLG model in which the population consists of agents
with heterogenous degrees of altruism toward their offspring whose labor supply is
endogenous. This model allows to encompass most of the OLG models in which
there is at least one agent à la Barro4.
3Under some mild assumptions, along equilibria close enough to the steady state, workers save
their end-of-period wage earnings only in the form of money while rentiers never wish to accumulate
money.
4Our approach embodies a wide class of OLG models with exogenous labor supply: those
where agents are exclusively altruists (see, for instance, Weil (1987) or Thibault (2000)), those
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Our framework, in which a finite number of dynasties can be distinguished by
their sole degree of altruism, is more general that Mankiw’s model of two types
of agents (altruists and selfish). It integrates recent empirical evidence on saving
and bequest motives (see Arrondel, Masson and Pestieau (1997)): the majority of
life-cyclers individuals are not selfish but constrained altruists. Hence, our micro-
foundations can be considered quite realistic, and one does not necessarily need to
assume the existence of egoistic agents, i.e. parents who do not care about the
welfare of their children.
Our model bears some similarities to Becker (1980) with heterogenous infinite
lived agents. It may be useful to give a brief outline of the similarities and denote
the differences. There are at least four reasons why our model differs from Ram-
sey (1928) or Becker (1980). First, in our context the individuals’ labor supply is
endogenous. Second, contrary to a widespread opinion, even if bequests are posi-
tive, the OLG model with dynastic altruism à la Barro (1974) is not equivalent to
the infinite horizon representative agent model5. Third, contrary to Becker (1980),
our model can possess life cyclers, and, therefore, consists of a mix of agents with
finite and infinite horizons.6 Fourth, the market structure of Becker (1980) requires
capital assets to be nonnegative at each moment of time and that agents without
capital have no access to the loan market; for high discount rate consumers with
zero initial capital stocks, this implies that the wage income is consumed at each
where population is a mix of agents à la Diamond and agents à la Barro (see, for instance, Michel
and Pestieau (1998) or Nourry and Venditti (2001)) or those with heterogenous dynasties (see, for
instance, Smetters (1999)). We also extend Michel and Pestieau’s (1999) analysis of a successive
generations model to an overlapping economy.
5As pointed by Michel, Thibault and Vidal (2003), there are at least four differences between
these two canonical models. Note that these differences are so important that they can lead to
surprising fiscal policy results (see Michel and Thibault (2003)).
6The differences between economies with finite or infinite lived consumers and those with both
finite and infinite lived consumers are stressed by Muller and Woodford (1988).
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time. Such an artificial constraint is naturally incorporated in our model, in which
the so-called nonnegative bequest constraint prevents individuals from transferring
resources away from their children.
In the long run, as in Mankiw (2000a,b), the society is divided in two classes:
altruistic agents who make positive transfers (the savers) and agents who cannot
afford making positive bequest (the spenders). Indeed, only the dynasty endowed
with the highest degree of altruism, has the possibility to leave a bequest to their
children. In such a situation, the steady state of the economy is the golden rule
modified by the degree of altruism of the most altruistic agents; regardless their
relative number.
If, as Mankiw (2000a,b), we interpret degree of altruism as a degree of patience
or as a propensity to save,7 this result is consistent with the intuition of Ramsey
(1928) and the findings of Becker (1980). Indeed, considering (in an heuristic way)
the case where different people discount future utility at different rates, Ramsey
(1928, p. 559) concluded his seminal paper as follows:
“ In such a case, therefore, equilibrium would be attained by a division
of society into two classes, the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident
at the subsistence level. ”
Since the most altruists (i.e., the savers) can inherit, they can behave as rentiers,
i.e, as individuals who can choose not to work. The aim of this paper is to estab-
lish the conditions under which rentiers emerge and to analyze their characteristics
(proportion, wealth, propensity to save).
First, we focus on the wealth of rentiers. We show that, ceteris paribus, there
exists a level of wealth above which savers decide to be rentiers. Importantly, this
7Separating the two concepts, Falk and Stark (2001) analyzes the roles of altruism and impa-
tience in the evolution consumption and bequests in an exogenous labor supply context. Drugeon
(2000) reexamines the role of long-run endogenous impatience in homothetic growth path.
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endogenous threshold depends on the proportion and the saving propensity of savers.
To give rise to the emergence of rentiers in the society, we show that it has to be
a sufficiently large proportion of spenders. In this case, spenders’saving are lower
and a large share of capital belongs to the savers. Since production is provided by
spenders, savers choose not to work. Hence, savers are rentiers if (and only if) their
proportion in the economy is sufficiently low.
Note that the existence of rentiers is really a consequence of the microeconomic
heterogeneity introduced in our macroeconomic model. Indeed, in a society ex-
clusively composed of homogenous savers, individuals choose to work so that the
production sector does not vanish.
After having studied their proportion, we focus on the propensity to save of ren-
tiers. Indeed, we examine the impact of the saving propensity of savers on their labor
supply. Then, we can distinguish two opposite effects when the previous propensity
increases. A wealth effect : since agents accumulate more, they are urged to lower
their labor supply because they are richer. But, since the wage increases and the
interest factor decreases, savers are incited to work more (wage/interest rate effect).
In a theoretical Cobb-Douglas economy we show that the wealth effect begins
to dominate the wage/interest rate effect and the labor supply of savers decreases.
These drop can lead savers to stop working. However, from a high value of the
propensity to save, the wage/interest rate effect is larger than the wealth effect and
the labor supply of savers increases.
Consequently, we show that to be a rentier, the saving propensity of a saver must
be sufficiently high to avoid that the saver is a spender, but not too high. Indeed
when his propensity to save is too large, a saver wishes to work to accumulate more
(and more) capital.
To conclude, we can make two remarks about the existence of a cut-off propensity
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to save above which savers always choose to work. First, this result proves that for
a given saving propensity, there exists a level of wealth above which savers choose
not to work. However, this wealth is not always attained. The same applies to the
richer.
Finally, our results can also contribute to an alternative interpretation of ob-
served variations in wealth inequality and can explain why rentiers seem to vanish
during the twentieth century. We can imagine that the rise of individualism during
the last century has generated a higher propensity to save and accumulate capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the OLG
model with heterogenous dynasties and endogenous labor supply. In section 3 we
exhibit conditions under which savers and rentiers may appear in the society. We
also examine the wealth of these rentiers. In section 4, we focus on the proportion
and the propensity to save of rentiers. Section 5 sets out our conclusions. Proofs
are gathered in appendix.
2 The model
Consider a perfectly competitive economy which extends over infinite discrete time.
The economy consists of N ≥ 1 families denoted with h ∈ {1, ..., N}. In each period
t, the size of each family h is denoted with Nht and grows at rate n. We consider
a population of size Nt which consists of a fraction p
h
t of each family h where the
proportion pht does not vary through time. Hence:
∀t > 0 : N
h
t
Nt
= pht = p
h and
h=N∑
h=1
ph = 1 and
Nt+1
Nt
=
Nht+1
Nht
= 1 + n
We assume that ph ∈ (0, 1] for h ∈ {1, ..., N}.
The consumers
Individuals of a family h are identical within as well as across generations and
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live for two periods. Hence, a family can be identified with a dynasty. For altruistic
agents, we adopt Barro (1974)’s definition of altruism: parents care about their
children welfare by weighting their children’s utility in their own utility function and
possibly leave them a bequest. When young, altruists of dynasty h born at time t
receive a bequest xht , work a portion l
h
t of their first period, receive the market wage
wtl
h
t , consume c
h
t and save s
h
t . When old, they consume part of the proceeds of their
savings and bequeath the remainder (1 + n)xt+1 to their (1 + n) children. Agents
perfectly foresee the interest factor Rt+1. Importantly, the bequest is restricted to
be non-negative. We denote by V ht the utility of an altruist of dynasty h:
V ht (x
h
t ) = max
ch
t
,ℓh
t
,sh
t
,dh
t+1
,xh
t+1
U(cht , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) + β
h V ht+1(x
h
t+1)
s.t wt(1− ℓht ) + xht = cht + sht (1)
Rt+1s
h
t = d
h
t+1 + (1 + n)x
h
t+1 (2)
xht+1 ≥ 0 (3)
ℓht ∈ [0, 1] (4)
where V ht+1(x
h
t+1) denotes the utility of a representative descendant who inherits x
h
t+1,
U(ch, ℓh, dh) his life cycle utility which depends on consumptions (ch, dh) and leisure
ℓh = 1− lh and βh the intergenerational degree of altruism of the dynasty h.
We assume that βN ∈ (0, 1) and (if N > 1) βh ∈ [0, βN) for h ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}.
Therefore, N is the most altruistic dynasty. Moreover, agents of all dynasties have
the same life cycle utility U(ch, ℓh, dh) satisfying Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 U(ch, ℓh, dh) is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable
over IR⋆+× (0, 1)× IR⋆+ and Uc(ch, ℓh, dh) > 0, Uℓ(ch,Lh, dh) > 0, Ud(ch, ℓh, dh) > 0,
and lim
̺→0
Uc(̺, ℓ
h, dh) = +∞, lim
̺→0
Uℓ(c
h, ̺, dh) = +∞, lim
̺→0
Ud(c
h, ℓh, ̺) = +∞.
The Hessian of U is negative definite. Moreover, cht , ℓ
h
t and d
h
t+1 are normal goods.
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Solving Vt(xt) gives the following optimality conditions:
Uc(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) = Rt+1Ud(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) (5)
wtUc(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1)−Uℓ(cht , ℓht , dht+1)


= 0 if lht > 0 (6a)
≤ 0 if lht = 0 (6b)
−(1 + n)Ud(cht , ℓht , dht+1) + βUc(cht+1, ℓht+1, dht+2) ≤ 0 (= if xt+1 > 0) (7)
and the transversality condition (see Michel (1990)): lim
t→+∞
βt+1Ud(c
h
t−1, ℓ
h
t−1, d
h
t )xt = 0.
Contrary to models with exogenous labor supply, the optimization problem of
altruistic consumers possesses two inequality constraints (xht+1 ≥ 0 and lht ≥ 0).
In Appendix, we prove that the solution sht of (5) can be expressed by a differen-
tiable function s˘h(lht , wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1). After substitution of c
h
t and d
h
t+1 in (5) and
(6a), the solutions lht and s
h
t of these equations can be expressed by differentiable
functions sh(.) and lh(.) of wt, Rt+1, x
h
t and x
h
t+1. Since c and d are normal goods,
sh(.) is increasing with respect to (w.r.t.) xht and x
h
t+1 and l
h(.) is decreasing w.r.t.
xht , increasing w.r.t. x
h
t+1. The higher is the inheritance, the higher are savings and
leisure. The more an altruist wants to leave a bequest, the more he works and saves.
An increase in wt can induce two opposite effects: it can increase labor supply be-
cause a higher wage incites to work more but it may decrease labor supply because,
to keep his income constant, an agent can work less. Hence, sh(.) is not necessarily
increasing w.r.t. its first argument. Concerning the second argument, things are
more complex and the sign of sh2 and l
h
2 are indeterminate. Taking into account the
constraint lht ≥ 0, the labor supply and the saving levels of an altruist who inherits
xht and wants to bequeath x
h
t+1 to each of his children may be locally expressed by
some continuous functions l˜h(.) and s˜h(.) of (wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1):
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lht = l˜
h(wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) ≡ max[0, lh(wt, Rt+1, xht , xht+1)]
8All the details of these tedious computations are gathered in Appendix 1.
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sht = s˜
h(wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) ≡ s˘h(l˜h(wt, Rt+1, xht , xht+1), wt, Rt+1, xht , xht+1)
These functions allow to characterize the bequest and labor supply of an agent
of dynasty h. Remark that if an altruist chooses to work, his savings function s˜h(.)
corresponds to the function sh(.). Since lh(.) is increasing with respect to xht , the
higher is the inheritance of an altruist, the lower is his labor supply.
It is also important to note that when xht and x
h
t+1 are zero, then the functions
sh(.) and lh(.) give the savings and the labor supply of each selfish agents as functions
of the wage rate and the interest rate. As the life cycle utility function U is identical
for the N dynasties, there exist some differentiable functions sDe(.) and lDe(.) such9
that for all h: sDe(wt, Rt) ≡ sh(wt, Rt, 0, 0) and lDe(wt, Rt) ≡ lh(wt, Rt, 0, 0). From
these function, we also define the function ϑ : IR+ → IR+ such that:
ϑ(z) =
sDe(f(z)− zf ′(z), f ′(z))
(1 + n)lDe(f(z)− zf ′(z), f ′(z))
The firms
Production occurs according to a constant returns to scale technology F (.) using
two inputs, capital Kt and labor Lt.
Assumption 2 F(K,L) is twice continuously differentiable, homogeneous of degree
1 with respect to capital and labor over the set (0,+∞)× (0,+∞) and satisfies:
∀L > 0 FK(., L) > 0 FKK(., L) < 0 and lim
L→0
F (K,L) = 0.
Homogeneity of degree one allows us to write output per young as a function of
the capital/labor ratio per young f(zt) = F (zt, 1) where zt = Kt/Lt.
9In this paper we denote with the upper-script "De" the variables which correspond to those of
the Diamond model with endogenous labor supply in which the population consists of life-cyclers.
Nourry (2001) contains a general dynamic study of this Diamond model.
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Markets are perfectly competitive. Each factor is paid its marginal product.
Assuming that capital fully depreciates after one period we obtain:
wt = FL(zt, 1) = f(zt)− ztf ′(zt) and Rt = FK(zt, 1) = f ′(zt) (8)
In each period, the labor market clears, i.e., Lt = Ntlt with lt = 1−∑h=Nh=1 phℓht .
The capital stock at time t + 1 is financed by the savings of the young generation
born in t. Hence, we have: Kt+1 = Ntst with st =
∑h=N
h=1 p
hsht . Therefore, in
intensive form:
kt+1 =
st
1 + n
with kt+1 =
Kt
Nt
(9)
3 Emergence of rentiers
We now confine our analysis to steady states. According to equations (5) and (7),
the long-term behavior of each dynasty h (h ∈ {1, ..., N}) must satisfy:
βh ≤ 1 + n
R
(= if xh > 0) (10)
Hence, only agents of dynasty N i.e., the dynasty endowed with the highest
degree of altruism, have the possibility to leave a bequest to their children. Indeed,
if there exists y ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} such that xy > 0 then equation (10) is not satisfied
for dynasties j where j ∈ {y + 1, ..., N}. Remark that it is sufficient to have some
unconstrained altruistic agents to reach the modified golden rule, and this result
holds true regardless of the proportion pN . Indeed, when xN is positive, according
to (8) and (10) the steady state capital/labor ratio z is equal to:
z = f ′−1(
1 + n
βN
) ≡ zˆ
Whatever their size, as well-known since Becker (1980), the most patients (or
altruists) impose their view on the long-run capital accumulation. This result does
not imply that savings and bequests both vanish for the less altruistic agents: their
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bequests are nil but their savings are not nil. However, they are only constituted
by their life-cycle savings. Indeed, we can distinguish two types of savings: life-
cycle and intertemporal savings (i.e., the bequests). As in Mankiw (2000a,b), all
the agents have life-cycle savings (denoted st). But only one type of individuals
leaves bequests, and consequently has intertemporal savings (denoted xt). Using
Mankiw (2000a,b)’s terminology, these agents are labelled as savers. Only altruists
of dynasty N can behave as savers because they are the only ones who can leave
positive bequests. Members of other dynasties (constrained altruists) are labelled
as spenders.
Existence of savers
Using Mankiw (2000a,b)’s terminology and according to the previous result, only
altruists of dynasty N can behave as savers. We now focus on the conditions under
which the most altruists are savers.
First, even though the capital/labor ratio of the modified golden rule10 is inde-
pendent of the sequence of {ph}h=Nh=1 , we show that the level of bequest xN is not.
Interestingly, when bequests of dynasty N are positive they depend on the propor-
tion pN but not on the other proportions {ph}h=N−1h=1 . This set of results follows from
the next lemma.
Lemma 1 Different transfers desired by the parent
(i) There exists a differentiable function x˘ of pN and βN such that x˘(pN , βN) is
the unique solution of:
ψ(x, pN , βN) = (1 + n)f ′−1(Rˆ)− p
NsN(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) + (1− pN)sDe(wˆ, Rˆ)
pN lN(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) + (1− pN)lDe(wˆ, Rˆ) = 0
(ii) There exists a differentiable function ~x of pN and βN such that ~x(pN , βN)
10In this paper we denote with the upperscript "∧" the variables evaluated at the modified
golden rule f ′−1((1 + n)/βN ). Hence, wˆ = f(zˆ)− zˆf ′(zˆ) and Rˆ = f ′(zˆ) = (1 + n)/βN .
12
is the unique solution of:
ζ(x, pN , βN) = (1 + n)f ′−1(Rˆ)− p
N s˘N(0, wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) + (1− pN)sDe(wˆ, Rˆ)
(1− pN)lDe(wˆ, Rˆ) = 0
The variable x˘(pN , βN) (positive or negative) is the transfer which is desired by
the parent. Indeed, it is obtained by maximization of the utility with respect to
xN and ℓN when ignoring inequality constraints xN ≥ 0 and ℓN ≤ 1. The solution
~x(pN , βN), is the transfer which is desired by the parent when he does not work
(i.e., assuming that ℓN = 1). According to Appendix 2, transfers x˘(pN , βN) and
~x(pN , βN) are increasing with respect to pN . The smaller the proportion of altruists
of dynasty N in the society, the larger the optimal amount of bequests. Intuitively,
bequests are going to offset the lack of savings by the spenders.
We can also remark that the function ψ(0, pN , βN) does not depend on the
proportion pN since, when x is equal to zero, the function ψ is equivalent to
(1 + n)f ′−1(Rˆ) − ϑ(zˆ). Using methodology developed in Thibault (2000, 2002),
the function ϑ is a convenient tool for deriving a general condition under which
savers exist. A simple extension of Thibault (2000) or of the theorem 1 (step 2) of
Thibault (2002) allow us to establish the next proposition.11
Proposition 1 Existence of savers
The economy experiences savers if and only if ϑ(zˆ) is lower than the modified
golden rule capital/labor ratio zˆ.
Contrary to the optimal level of bequest, the condition to obtain positive bequests
does not depend on the proportion of agents of dynasty N . It is the same as that in
a society consisting only of altruists. A strength of this condition is that it is valid
whatever the form of the economy without bequests motive. Indeed, this condition
11Details of proof are contained in a preliminary version of this paper available on the web:
http://durandal.cnrs-mrs.fr/GREQAM/dt/wp-pdf00/00A32.pdf
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holds whatever the number and stability properties of the equilibria of the Diamond
model with endogenous labor supply. Note that if we assume that the Diamond
economy has a unique and stable (non-trivial) steady state, we can enlighten a
threshold value of the degree of altruism above which altruists of dynasty N leaves
an inheritance.12
Emergence of rentiers
Importantly, when bequests are positive, agents of dynasty N are savers. Then,
the economy is at the modified golden rule steady state which depends on the saving
propensity βN of savers, but not on their proportion. Note that this result is similar
to those of Kaldorian models (see Britto (1972)) but it is obtained in an endogenous
way.
Interestingly, savers may not work and capital owners can endogenously emerge.
Indeed, since the interest factor is equal to (1 + n)/βN , investing βNxN is sufficient
to leave (1+n)xN to one’s children. The difference, xN−βNxN , between the bequest
received and the actualized value of bequest handing down is defined as the rent13
(or patrimony return) of the saver and is denoted by ρ.
When a saver chooses not to work his labor income is zero and his wealth only
consists of his bequest xN . Hence, this patrimony corresponds to the wealth of a
rentier. Then, to study conditions under which such rentiers can emerge in the
society, we first focus on the desired wealth by the savers to be rentiers. Indeed,
according to the next proposition, we can exhibit a wealth value x¯ above which
savers do not work.
12This result extends the well known result obtained by Weil (1987) in a theoretical setup where
altruists are homogenous and have an exogenous labor supply.
13From (1) and (2): w(1 − ℓN) + (1− (1 + n)/R)xN = cN + dN/R. The life cycle income of a
saver is composed of his labor income w(1−ℓN) and the return (1−(1+n)/R)xN of his patrimony.
Since RxN = ((1 + n)/βN )xN this return is equal to (1− βN )xN .
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Proposition 2 Emergence and wealth of rentiers
There exists a (unique) wealth x¯ (depending on βN) such that savers behave as
rentiers if and only if their wealth is larger than x¯.
Given their propensity to save βN , the wealth level x¯ is the minimal wealth of
rentiers. Hence, intuitively, ρ¯ = (1 − β)x¯ corresponds at the minimum patrimony
return level which incites a saver to behave as a capital owners. Importantly, x¯ only
depends on the propensity to save βN , but, according to lemma 1, wealth of rentiers
~x depends both on pN and βN .
4 Specific characters of rentiers
Since endogenous wealths x¯ and xN depend on exogenous parameters pN and βN ,
we now focus on the correlation between these two specific characters of savers and
the existence of rentiers.
Proportion of rentiers
Although the existence of savers is independent of their proportion, existence of
rentiers is based on the relative weight of savers in our economy. Indeed, according
to their proportion, savers are rentiers or not. More precisely we can show:
Proposition 3 Existence and proportion of rentiers
There exists a (unique) proportion p⋆ (depending on βN) such that savers behave
as rentiers if and only if their proportion is lower than p⋆.
According to lemma 1, bequests are a decreasing function of p. Hence, below
the critical value p⋆, the size of wealth x is larger than x¯ and incites savers not to
work. The proportion p⋆ ∈ [0, 1) only depends on βN . And, when pN is lower than
p⋆, contrary to the Kaldorian tradition of two-class growth models, rentiers emerge
endogenously.
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Intuitively, to have rentiers in a society, it is necessary that spenders are in a
large proportion so that savers choose not to work. Savings of spenders are lower
and a large share of capital belongs to a few savers. Since production is provided
by spenders, savers choose not to work.
We can also remark that savers are obliged to work when the society consists
exclusively of savers. Intuitively, they choose to work so that the production sector
does not vanish. Indeed, there are no other workers when pN = 1. Hence, the
assumption F (K, 0) = 0 implies p⋆ < 1 and the existence of rentiers is really a
consequence of the microeconomic heterogeneity introduced in our model.
Propensity to save of rentiers
Both thresholds x¯ and p⋆ only depends on βN . In the light of this fact, we now
study the relation existing between the propensity to save βN and the existence
of rentiers. According to proposition 2, this relation depends on the correlation
between xN and βN . Through a simple example in an exogenous labor supply
framework, Thibault (2001) shows that an increase in βN can result in a decrease
in xN even if the Diamond model has a unique and stable steady state.14 To avoid
any complications that may arise from multiple locally stable steady states or exotic
production function, we consider a Cobb-Douglas economy to study the propensity
of save of rentiers.
Then we assume the life cycle utility function of each dynasty is: U(cht , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1)
= µ ln cht + ξ ln ℓ
h
t + γ ln d
h
t+1 with (µ, ξ, γ) ∈ IR3⋆+ and µ + ξ + γ = 1. Moreover, we
assume that the production function is f(zt) = Az
α
t with A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1).
With these specifications, we can use proposition 1 and 3 to determine under
14To rule out this counterintuitive case, an assumption on the curvature of the production
function is necessary (see Thibault (2001)).
16
which conditions savers exist and what is their labor supply.15
(i) There exist savers if and only if the propensity to save βN is sufficiently
strong, i.e., larger than β⋆ with:
β⋆ =
γ(α−1 − 1)
µ+ γ
Since savers must exist to eventually obtain rentiers, we assume that β⋆ is lower
than one or, equivalently, µ/γ greater than α−1 − 2.
(ii) Savers are rentiers if and only if their proportion pN in the society is lower
than p⋆ with:
p⋆ =
(1− βN)ξ((µ+ γ)βN − (α−1 − 1)γ)
(γ + µβN)(α−1 − 1) + (1− βN)ξ((µ+ γ)βN − (α−1 − 1)γ)
It is necessary that the proportion of spenders is large enough so that a spender
chooses not to work. Hence, below the critical value pN , their wealth incites savers
not to work.
To be rentier, we can remark that a saver must have a sufficiently large propensity
to save because bequest must be positive. However, this propensity to save must
not be too high. Indeed, a saver can wish work to accumulate more (and more)
capital. In such a case, he may accumulate so much that he would not benefit from
a patrimony return. For instance, if the saving propensity of savers is full (βN = 1),
they choose to work as spenders to accumulate maximum of wealth.16
More precisely, we are going to show (proposition 4) that a saver does not work if
and only if his propensity to save is greater than β⋆ and satisfies AβN 2+BβN+C ≤ 0
15In long-run, bequests of agents of dynasty i (i ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}) are nil and their labor supply
are constant and equal to µ+ γ.
16Reinterpreting βN as a degree of altruism the intuition is the following. Agents of dynasty N
can be too altruistic to benefit from a rent. For instance, if they are fully altruistic (i.e. βN = 1),
they transmit the received bequest in its entirety (ρ = p⋆ = 0).
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with A = (1 − pN)ξ(µ + γ), B = pNµ(α−1 − 1) − (1 − pN)ξ(µ + γα−1) and C =
(α−1 − 1)(pNγ + (1 − pN)ξγ). We also show that the discriminant ∆ ≡ B2 − 4AC
of this polynomial is a polynomial of p which experiences two roots included in
(0, 1). These roots only depend on the elasticity of life cycle utility and production
function. We assume than pN is lower than pˆ ; the smallest of the two previous
roots. From β± = (−B ±
√
∆)/(2A), we now can determine the propensity to save
of rentiers.
Proposition 4 Existence and propensity to save of rentiers
Savers are rentiers if and only if their propensity to save is greater than β− and
lower than β+.
To give an illustration of this proposition, we represent the labor supply 1− ℓN
of savers according to their propensity to save.
6
-
µ+ γ
β⋆ β− β+ 1
β
0
1− ℓN
.....................................
.....................................
Then, we can distinguish two effects.17 When agents of dynasty N becomes
savers a wealth effect implies a fall in the labor supply 1 − ℓN . Intuitively, when a
dynasty begins to accumulate capital, its members are incited to lower their labor
17Indeed, after computations we have: lN (wˆ, Rˆ, x) = µ + γ − ξ
wˆ
(1 − (1 + n)/Rˆ)x. According to
this equation we obtain, since ∂lN/∂wˆ ≥ 0, ∂lN/∂Rˆ ≤ 0, ∂lN/∂x ≥ 0, ∂wˆ/∂β > 0 and ∂Rˆ/∂β < 0,
our two opposite effects.
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supply because they are richer. When spenders are numerous (1 − pN > 1 − pˆ),
this drop is so important that savers choose not to work if their propensity to
save is contained between β− and β+. However, when β
N is greater than β+, a
wage/interest rate effect incites savers to work. Intuitively, When βN increases, the
wage wˆ and the interest rate Rˆ are more attractive. For higher propensities to save,
the wage/interest rate effect dominates the wealth effect. Hence, a saver wishes to
work to accumulate more and more capital.
In contrast to an accepted idea, a rentier is not a rich with a very large propensity
to save. Intuitively, he gives up his labor income in order to enjoy leisure. Interest-
ingly, contrary to the main assumption of kaldorian models, the propensity to save
βw of the agents who decide to work is not always lower than that of capital owners,
βc. Indeed, a two class society in which the propensity to save of workers is greater
than that of capital owners endogenously emerge as soon as β− < β
c < β+ < β
w.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to analyze the characteristics of rentiers. Precisely, we
have focused on the proportion, the wealth and the propensity to save of rentiers.
Using Mankiw’s (2000a,b) savers-spenders theory, we have developed a theoret-
ical framework to investigate the microfoundations of the macroeconomic models
with rentiers. Indeed, we have analyzed a growth model in which the emergence
of rentiers is a natural consequence of the intertemporal utility maximization of
altruists individuals.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: rentiers in a society are nec-
essarily in a low proportion,18 and have a sufficiently large wealth. Interestingly,
18Even if this result seems intuitive, its importance comes from the analysis of the threshold
proportion under which savers are rentiers. Indeed, for some parameter sets this threshold value
can be (relatively) large and can explain why rentiers are localized in particular countries.
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their propensity to save must be sufficient to reach a high level of wealth but not
too large. In such a case, savers wish to work to accumulate more capital.
Many economists have constructed macroeconomic models to investigate the
wealth distribution, inequality and/or potential forces behind the rise and fall of
class societies (see, for instance, Piketty (1997), Matsuyama (2000,2002)). In these
studies, all individuals are altruists and the source of heterogeneity across households
is not their preferences but their wealth.
Contrary to these strands of literature, our framework allows us to explain the
emergence of rentiers and can also contribute to an alternative interpretation for
understanding the mechanisms behind the formation of class society.
Finally, our analysis takes a first step toward studying the observed variations
in wealth inequality. As noted by Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001, p. 2):
"a natural way to treat this issue (wealth inequality) is provided by fully compet-
itive, dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogenous agents". Then, the
framework developed in this paper seems relevant to treat this issue which is on our
research agenda.
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Appendix
Appendix 1
Let V h(sht , l
h
t ) = U(x
h
t + wtl
h
t − sht , 1− lht , Rt+1sht − (1 + n)xht+1).
Then V h11 = U
h
11 − 2Uh13Rt+1 +Uh33R2t+1, V h22 = Uh11w2t − 2Uh12wt +Uh22 and Hess V h =
 V
h
11 D
D V h22

 whereD = −Uh11wt+Uh13Rt+1wt+Uh12−Uh23Rt+1 and Uhij = Uij(cht , ℓht , dht+1).
Since Hess V h = A × Hess Uh × AT where A =

 −1 0 Rt+1
wt −1 0

 is a matrix
of rank 2, Hess Uh negative definiteness implies Hess V h negative definiteness.
Hence V h11, V
h
22 are negative and the determinant of Hess V denoted ζ is positive.
V h is concave with respect to sht and l
h
t and, when the conditions (5) is equivalent
to V h1 (s
h
t , l
h
t , wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) = 0. Since V
h
11 6= 0, there exist19 a differentiable
function s˘h such that sht = s˘
h(lht , wt, Rt+1, xt, xt+1) satisfies equations (5).
We can also remark that the two conditions (5) and (6a) are equivalent to
V h1 (s
h
t , l
h
t , wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) = 0 and V
h
2 (s
h
t , l
h
t , wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) = 0. Since ζ 6= 0,
there exist20 two differentiable functions sh and lh such that sht = s
h(wt, Rt+1, xt, xt+1)
and lht = l
h(wt, Rt+1, xt, xt+1) satisfy equations (5) and (6a).
19Given lht , wt, Rt+1, xt and xt+1, the set of constraints under which we maximize the concave
function V h is a compact set. This ensures the existence of s˘h(.).
20Given wt, Rt+1, xt and xt+1, the set of constraints under which we maximize the concave
function V h is a compact set. This ensures the existence of sh(.) and lh(.).
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The differentiability follows from the implicit function theorem:

∂sh
∂wt
∂lh
∂wt
∂sh
∂Rt+1
∂lh
∂Rt+1
∂sh
∂xht
∂lh
∂xht
∂sh
∂xht+1
∂lh
∂xht+1


=
1
ζ


DUh1 + l
h
t γ
h
1 −Uh1 V h11 + lhtRt+1γh3
−V h22Uh3 + sht γh2 DUh3 + sht γh3
γh1 Rt+1γ
h
3
−(1 + n)γh2 −(1 + n)γh3


where γh1 = Rt+1(φ
h
3 +
φh6
Rt+1
−wtφh5) , γh2 = Rt+1[wt(φh2 +
φh5
Rt+1
−wtφh4)−(φh1 +
φh3
Rt+1
−
wtφ
h
2)] and γ
h
3 = Rt+1(φ
h
2 +
φh5
Rt+1
− wtφh4).
The φhi ’s parameter is defined by: φ
h
1 = U
h
22U
h
33−Uh232, φh2 = Uh12Uh33−Uh13Uh23, φh3 =
Uh12U
h
23−Uh13Uh22, φh4 = Uh11Uh33−Uh132, φh5 = Uh11Uh23−Uh12Uh13 and φh6 = Uh11Uh22−Uh122.
Let Ωh the life cycle income of an agent of dynasty h. With this income he can
buy ch at price 1, leisure ℓh at price w and dh at 1/R. Hence, consider the static
program maxch,ℓh,dh U(c
h, ℓh, dh) subject to the constraint Ωh = ch + wℓh + dh/R.
This program is equivalent to maxch,ℓh A(ch, ℓh,Ωh) or maxdh,ℓh B(dh, ℓh,Ωh) where
A(ch, ℓh,Ωh) = U(ch, ℓh, R(Ωh − wℓh − ch)) and B(dh, ℓh,Ωh) = U(Ωh − wℓh −
dh/R, ℓh, dh). Using implicit-function theorem we can show that: ∂ch/∂Ωh has the
sign of A12A23−A13A22, ∂ℓh/∂Ωh the sign of B12B13−B11B23 and ∂dh/∂Ωh the sign
of B12B23 − B13B22. After computations, ∂ch/∂Ωh has the sign of φh1 +
φh3
R
− wφh2 ,
∂ℓh/∂Ωh has the sign of −φh2−
φh5
R
+wφh4 , and ∂d
h/∂Ωh has the sign of φh3+
φh6
R
−wφh5 .
By definition of the normality, ch, ℓh, and dh are normal goods if and only if ∂ch/∂Ωh,
∂ℓh/∂Ωh and ∂dh/∂Ωh are positive. Therefore, under Assumption 2 we have: γh1 > 0,
γh2 < 0 and γ
h
3 < 0. Hence s
h
3 > 0, s
h
4 > 0, l
h
3 < 0, and l
h
4 > 0. QED
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Appendix 2: Proof of lemma 1
(i) Using the function ψ : (−∞, x⋆)× (0, 1]× (0, 1)→ IR we21 have:
ψ′x(x, p
N , βN) = −p
N
u2
× [s′xN(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x)u− l′xN(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x)v]
where u and v are positive.
According to appendix 1, sN(w,R, x, x) is an increasing function of x and l′x
N(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x)
has the sign of (Rˆ− (1 + n))γN3 . Since γN3 is negative and Rˆ = (1+ n)/βN > 1 + n,
l′x
N(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) is negative. Intuitively, since Rˆ > 1 + n, agents work less because
invest x at rate Rˆ is sufficient to leave (1 + n)x to their children.
Hence, s′x
N (wˆ, Rˆ, x, x)u− l′xN(wˆ, Rˆ, x˘N , x, x)v is positive. Since ψ′x(x, pN , βN) 6=
0, there exist a differentiable function x˘ of (pN ,βN) such that: x = x˘(pN , βN) verify
ψ(x, pN , βN) = 0. Moreover, since s′x
N(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) is positive and l′x
N (wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) is
negative, we have sN(wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘) > sDe(wˆ, Rˆ) and lN (wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘) < lDe(wˆ, Rˆ) when x˘
is positive. Hence, ψ′pN (x˘, p
N , βN) is negative when x˘ is positive. Since ψ′x(x˘, p
N , βN)
is negative, ∂x˘(pN , βN)/∂pN is negative when x˘(pN , βN) is positive.
(ii) Using the function ζ : IR × (0, 1]× (0, 1)→ IR we have:
ζ ′x(x, p
N , βN) = − p
N
1− pN ×
s˘′x
N (0, wˆ, Rˆ, x, x)
(1 + n)lDe(wˆ, Rˆ)
Since s˘N(0, w, R, x, x) is an increasing function of x, ζ ′x(x, p
N , βN) is negative.
Since ζ ′x(x, p
N , βN) 6= 0, there exist a differentiable function ~x of (pN ,βN) such that:
x = ~x(pN , βN) verify ζ(x, pN , βN) = 0. Moreover, ζ ′pN (x˘, p
N , βN) < 0. Hence, since
ζ ′x(x˘, p
N , βN) < 0, ∂~x(pN , βN)/∂pN < 0. QED
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2
According to appendix 2, l′x
N(wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) is negative. Hence, since lN(wˆ, Rˆ, 0, 0) =
lDe(wˆ, Rˆ) is positive, there exists a unique x¯ (x¯ ∈ (0,+∞) or x¯ = +∞) such that
lN (wˆ, Rˆ, x, x) is positive if and only if x ∈ [0, x¯).
21The threshold x⋆ is defined in the proof of proposition 3.
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When an agent of dynasty N choose to leave a positive bequest, is at the modified
golden rule equilibrium. Hence, according to appendix 1 and lemma 1, the stationary
labor supply of an agent of dynasty N is l¯N = Max[0, lN (wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘)].
Hence, according to proposition 1 and lemma 1, our model has a steady state in
which agents of dynasty N do not work if and only if ϑ(zˆ) < zˆ and lN (wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘) ≤ 0,
i.e., if and only if lN(wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘) is not positive while x˘ is positive. According to the
first point of this appendix, this condition is equivalent to x˘ ≥ x¯. QED
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 3
(i) According to appendix 2, the sign of x˘(pN , βN) is independent of pN . Indeed
it is entirely determined by the sign of zˆ − ϑ(zˆ). Therefore, we can distinguish two
cases according to the sign of x˘.
- If x˘(pN , βN) is not positive, x¯(βN)− x˘(pN , βN) > 0 for all pN . Hence p⋆ = 0.
- If x˘(pN , βN) is positive, we have shown in the proof of lemma 4 that x˘(p, βN) is
decreasing with respect to p. Moreover it is possible to show that for p = 1 we have
x¯(βN) > x˘(1, βN), i.e., lN(wˆ, Rˆ, x˘(1, βN), x˘(1, βN)) is positive. Indeed the realistic
assumption limL→0 F (K,L) = 0 implies
22 that ℓNt < 1. Intuitively, agents choose
to work so that the production sector does not vanish. Indeed, they are no other
workers when pN = 1. Hence, since x˘′p(p, β
N) < 0 and x˘(1, βN) < x¯(βN) >, there
exists a unique p⋆ ∈ [0, 1) such that x¯(βN)− x˘(pN , βN) > 0 if and only if pN < p⋆.
(ii) According to the previous appendix, our model has a steady state in which
agents of dynasty N do not work if and only if ϑ(zˆ) < zˆ and lN (wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘) ≤ 0, i.e.,
if and only if lN(wˆ, Rˆ, x˘, x˘) is not positive while x˘ is positive. According to part (i)
of this appendix, this condition is equivalent to pN < p⋆. QED
22limL→0 F (K,L) = 0 implies limL→0 KFK(K,L) = 0. Hence, if l
N
t = 0 then Rt+1s
N
t = 0.
According to (1) that implies dNt+1 = 0. Impossible because lim̺→0 Ud(c
N , ℓN , ̺) = +∞.
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Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 4
Inequation p ≤ p⋆ is equivalent to P (βN) = AβN2 +BβN + C ≤ 0. According to
proposition 6, l¯N = 0 if and only if P (βN) ≤ 0.
Assume that β⋆ < 1 23. Sine P (β⋆) = pN (α−1 − 1)(µβ⋆ + γ) and P (1) =
pN(α−1 − 1)(µ + γ) are positive and since lim
̺→±∞
P (̺) = +∞, if P has two roots
denoted β− and β+, these roots are either both lower than β
⋆ or both in (β⋆, 1) or
both greater than one.
Since A is positive, the only degrees of altruism for which l¯N = 0 are the βN
such that:β⋆ < β− < β
N < β+ < 1. For the existence of β− and β+ it is necessary
and sufficient that ∆ ≥ 0. Moreover, (β−, β+) ∈ (β⋆, 1)2 if and only if C < A <
−B/(2β⋆). Indeed, if C < A we have β−β+ < 1. Hence β− and β+ are not both
greater than one. Similarly, if −B/A > 2β⋆, we have β−+ β+ > 2β⋆. Hence β− and
β+ are not both lower than β
⋆.
Hence, agents of dynasty N are rentiers if and only if:
(i) ∆ ≥ 0, (ii) C < A < −B/(2β⋆), (iii) βN ∈ (β−, β+), (iv) β⋆ < 1 (11)
We have∆ = Q(p) = ap2+bp+cwith a = f+g+h, b = −(2g+h) and c = g where
f = µ2(α−1−1)2, g = [ξ(µ+γ(2−α−1)]2 and h = 2(α−1−1)ξ[µ(µ+γα−1)+2(µ+γ)γ].
Q increases as long as p < p0 and decreases if p > p0 with p0 = −b/2a ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, Q(p0) is negative (sign of −2[γ2 +µγα−1]). Since a, c and f are positive,
we have Q(0) > 0, Q(1) > 0 and lim
p→∞
Q(p) = +∞. Hence, Q has two roots pˆ and p˜
which are both in (0, 1). Thus, ∆ > 0⇔ p ∈ (0, pˆ) ∪ (p˜, 1).
Let U = ξ′[µ+ γ(2− α−1)]. With this notation we have:
[C < A and µ/γ > α−1 − 2] ⇔ p < p1 = U/(U + (α−1 − 1)γ) and
[A < −B/(2β⋆) and µ/γ > α−1 − 2] ⇔ p < p2 = U/(U + (α−1 − 1)µ).
Q(p2) has the sign of −2[γ2 + µγα−1]. Hence, Q(p2) < 0.
23If β⋆ ≥ 1, altruists of dynasty N work for all βN ∈ (0, 1).
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Assume now that p1 < p2
24 i.e. γ > µ.
Since µ2+γµ(2−α−1)−2γµ−2γ2α−1 ≤ γ(−µ−2γ(α−1−1)) < 0 we have Q(p1) < 0.
Since Q(p1) and Q(p2) are negative we have pˆ < p1 < p2 < p˜. Consequently, [β
⋆ < 1,
∆ ≥ 0 and C < A < −B/(2β⋆)] ⇔ [p ≤ pˆ and β⋆ < 1].
Then, according to (11), our model experiences a steady state in which agents
of dynasty N do not work if and only if β⋆ < 1, p ≤ pˆ and βN ∈ (β−, β+). QED
24If p2 < p1 then p < p2 implies p < p1. Therefore Q(p2) < 0 is sufficient to obtain our result.
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